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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

SAM B. CONOVER,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12911

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff-appellant,
State of Utah, from an order quashing the information
and dismissing the case.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent, Sam B. Conover, was charged in a
complaint and information with violating Section 58-336 (1) , Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1971) , selling a depressant,
stimulant, or hallucinogenic drug, to wit: methamphetamine. Judge Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, on motion of the respondent,
quashed the information and dismissed the case.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of fu
district court and an order reinstating the information
against respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 1, 1972, a complaint was filed against
respondent, charging him with having committed a felonr
by selling methamphetamine on December 19, 1971 (R
4). He was arraigned on February 14, 1972, and hadi
preliminary hearing on March 15, 1972. J. Gordon Knua·
sen, Judge of the City Court of Provo City bound him
over to the Fourth Judicial District Court (R. 3) witn
an information being filed in the district court on Maren
16, 1972, charging him with a violation of Section 58-33·
6 (1) Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, by having solo
methamphetamine on or about December 19, 1971 (R
7). Methamphetamine was defined as a "depressant, stim·
ulant or hallucinogenic drug" in Section 58-33-l(d) (2).
In 1971 the Utah Legislature passed the Utah Con·
trolled Substances Act, L. 1971, Ch. 145, codified as Title
58, Chapter 37, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1971). Thi!
act took effect on January 1, 1972, and repealed Title 51,
Chapter 33, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Under this new
act methamphetamine is a controlled substance pursuan!
to Schedule II in Section 58-37-4 (3) (b) (iii) (B) ·
On April 4, 1972, a motion to quash the above infor·
mation was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Courl.
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This motion alleged that the statute under which defendant was charged had been repealed on January 1, 1972,
and was not a proper basis for a complaint filed February
1, 1972 (R. 10). This motion was granted on April 27,
1972, (R. 13, 18) at a hearing before the Honorable Allen
B. Sorensen, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
who signed an order quashing the information and dismissing the case on May 4, 1972 (R. 17) . The appellant,
State of Utah, appeals this order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS
OF THE REPEAL OF THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE BECAUSE VIOLATIONS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT ARE UNAFFECTED BY
THAT ACT.
At common law a general repeal of a criminal statute
without a saving clause was a bar to subsequent prosecution arising out of occurrences before the repeal. Huffman
v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicwl District In and
For GaUatin County, 154 Mont. 201, 461 P. 2d 847 (1969).
But this was a rule of legislative intent and was subject
to the exception that where there is a substantial reenactment of the same provisions the legislature did not intend
for there to be a general remission of all crimes not yet
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reduced to judgment. Huffman, supra, In re Dapper, r;
Cal. Rptr. 897, 71 C. 2d 184, 454 P. 2d 905, cert. den.,
Dapper v. California, 397 U. S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 906, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 90, reh. den., 398 U. S. 954, 90 S. Ct. 1865, 26 L.
Ed. 2d 299 (1969). And of course a valid saving ciaUSI
obviated any possible question. Huffman, supra.
Section 18 of the Utah Controlled Substances Act,

§ 58-37-18 Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1971), is a sa\iJ!i

clause for prior violations of similar statutes, and provides:
"(1) (a) Prosecution for violation of an)'
law or offense occurring prior to the effective date
of this act shall not be affected by this act; pro·
vided, that sentences imposed after the effective
date of this act may not exceed the maximum
terms specified and the judge has discretion to
impose any minimum sentence.
(b) Civil seizures, forfeitures, and injunctive
proceedings commenced prior to the effective dare
of this act shall not be affected by this act.

(c) All administrative proceedings pendini
before any agency or court on the effective
of this act shall be continued and brought to final
determination in accordance with laws and
lations in effect prior to the effective date of this
act. Drugs placed under
prio! 1;<> ena:
ment of this act which are not listed within schllea
ules I through V shall be automatically .contro .
and listed in the appropriate schedule without fuI
ther proceedings.
(2) This act does not affect
ties that mature, penalties that are mcurred,
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proceedings that are begun before its effective
date.
(3) This act shall be construed to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it where laws are similar
to this act."
A similar legislative intent is evidenced in the general
statute referring to the revision and repeal of statutes,
Section 68-2-8; Utah Code Ann. (1953):
"No offense committed, and no penalty or forfeiture incurred, under any statute hereby repealed
before the repeal takes effect shall be affected by
the repeal, except that whe11 a punishment, penalty or forfeiture is mitigated by the provisions
herein contained such provisions shall be applied
to a judgment pronounced after the repeal."
All statutes in Utah, whether in derogation of the
common law or not, are to be construed liberally in the
interest of justice and their statutory objective. Section
68-3-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) so provides:
"The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this stat.e. The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of
equity and the rules of common law in reference
to the same matt.er the rules of equity shall pre-

vail."

The above principles of law were construed in !Iii
similar Utah case of People v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 (1877).
In that case the defendant was charged in an indictment
in May, 1876, for having committed a crime in Jan\llllj,
1876. Between these dates, in March, 1876, the sectiot
under which he was charged was repealed by the nei
"Penal Code." The defendant attacked the validity oi
the indictment. A saving clause in the "Penal Code"
vided for an effective date of the act and added that:
"Any act or_ omission commenced prior to tba1
time may be inquired of, prosecuted and
in the same manner as if this code had not t.akeo
effect." Id.
To the allegation that the prosecution was void becawi
it was commenced after the effective date of the repealini
statute the Court replied:
"The counsel for the appellant claims, in
effect, that a general jubilee was proclaimed DJ
the passage of the 'Penal Code,' for all criminalsin
this Territory, unless the prosecution against them
was commenced before that act went into effect.
Sec. 4 of the act (C. L. § 1834) declares that:
'The rule of the common law that penal statuw
are to be strictly construed has no application to
this code; all its provisions are to be construe? ac·
cording to the fair import of their term:i,
a
view to effect its object and to promote Justice.
Without the aid of this section
c?uld
give the construction to the act which is ask
for by the defendant; and, certainly, with
the guide which the legislature themselves ha
furnished us to construe it, we are at a loss to s£f
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how it would 'promote justice' to judicially construe it into a general jail delivery and free pardon
for all offenses committed before the passage of
the act. The plain and evident intent of the legislature was to steer clear of any difficulty arising
from the enactment of ex post facto laws, and to
retain in force the former Crimes and Punishment
Act, so far as it related to offenses committed prior
to the time the 'Penal Code' went into effect. In
my opinion the language employed accomplishes
this purpose." 2 Utah at 330.
The same reasoning and result are found in the Huffman case, supra. There the defendant was charged in an
information in April, 1969, with having sold marijuana in
January, 1969. Between the dates of the crime and information the Montana Legislature passed a new drug
law which repealed the old one under which he was
charged. This new act had no saving clause, but Montana
had a general statutory saving clause which provided that
a repeal of a criminal statute did not constitute a bar to
prosecution for offenses committed prior to the repeal
unless a contrary intention was clearly expressed. The
Court held, based on the statutory saving clause, that the
prosecution under the old statute was preserved. They
further noted that:
"The same result would follow at common law
in the absence of such statute. . . . Where there
is an outright repeal and a substantial reenactment, it is presumed that the legislature did not
intend a remission of crimes not reduced to judgment at that time." 461 P. 2d at 850.
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The foregoing clearly indicates that the present in.
formation charging the respondent with a violation ol
Section 58-33-6 (1) is entirely proper and valid, even
though between the date of the crime and the dat;e of !,hi
information that section was repealed by a new
The current statute clearly provides that:
"Prosecutions for violations of any law 01
offense occurring prior to the effective dat;e of tllli
act shall not be affected by this act. . .." Utal
Code Ann. § 58-37-18 (1) (a).

This offense occurred prior to the effective date of ti!!
new Controlled Substances Act (January 1, 1972) ana
therefore, prosecution is unaffected by that act. The gen·
eral legislative intent to preserve prosecutions under re
pealed laws is also emphasized in Section 68-2-8. Further·
more, the substantial reenactment of the repealed st;atutl
further indicates the legislative intent to preserve prosecutions based on violations of the prior narcotic laws. The
selling of methamphetamine was illegal then and it IB
illegal now. This alone would justify prosecution under
the prior statute. It was obviously not the legislature'!
intention to declare a general amnesty for all who violateO
Utah's narcotics laws prior to January 1, 1972.
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CONCLUSION
The specific statutory saving clause, the general stat-

utory saving clause, and the common law rule that sub-

stantial reenactment preserves prosecution of prior
offenses, all indicate that the information charging the
respondent with selling methamphetamine prior to J anuary l, 1972, is valid and proper. The information should
be reinstated and the order quashing the information and
dismissing the case should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appell,ants

